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Sometimes in a philosophical dispute, conflicting parties debate the truth 
or falsity of a given proposition. ›A fetus is a person‹, ›The meaning of 
the truth predicate is captured by the disquotational schema‹, and ›Con-
sciousness is an emergent property of complex neural systems‹, are some 
examples of propositions whose truth and relative warrant are debated in 
recent philosophical literature. While many philosophical disputes follow 
this model, not all do. After all, in some philosophical disputes, no uncon-
troversial framing of the terms of disagreement is available. Indeed, in some 
such disputes, it is not the truth of or warrant for a proposition that is be-
ing debated, but instead the very words used to describe the disagreement 
itself.
When surveying the scholarly literature over Wittgensteinian fideism, it 
is easy to get the sense that the principal interlocutors, Kai Nielsen and 
D.Z. Phillips, talk past one another, but finding the right words for apprais-
ing the distance between the two voices is difficult. In this paper, I seek to 
appreciate this intellectual distance through an exploration of the varying 
philosophical aims of Nielsen and Phillips, of the different intellectual im-
peratives that guide their respective conceptions of philosophical practice. 
In so doing, I seek to show how a contemplative mode in philosophy may 
be used to appraise a philosophical dispute and the terms of disagreement. 
In this case, a contemplative approach to understanding the dispute would 
frame Nielsen’s and Phillips’ contributions against the backdrop of the 
ends they conceive philosophy to have.
I contend that the varying philosophical aims of Nielsen and Phillips 
contribute to the seemingly intractable nature of their dispute, but aware-
ness of these differing conceptions of philosophical practice may help con-
temporary scholars to understand similar criticisms when they practice or 
promote a contemplative philosophy of religion. For Nielsen, something 
akin to the evidentialism of W.K. Clifford and the fallibilism of C.S. Peirce 
provides the epistemic end of philosophical inquiry, an end Nielsen un-
derstands to be disrupted by the possibility of discrete religious and secular 
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language-games with variant epistemic standards of justification. For Phil-
lips, philosophical investigation aims at drawing the philosopher’s aware-
ness to the complexity of human life with language. Notably, Phillips is 
keen to object to the idea of Wittgensteinian fideism insofar as he takes it 
to characterize religious life as being somehow cut off from other aspects 
of language or life. In this sense, Wittgensteinian fideism – with its com-
monly associated ideas of discrete language-games and standards of ratio-
nality – would seem to foreclose on the possibility of religion being a deep 
aspect of life (i.e. something that may be thoroughly connected with many 
aspects of one’s life, such as one’s moral character, social allegiances or aes-
thetic sensibilities). The contemplative ideal that Phillips develops from his 
reading of Wittgenstein is one that vigilantly pursues an appreciation for 
the diversity and complexity of religious discourses. Phillips aims not only 
to appreciate the distinctiveness of a mode of discourse, but also to avoid 
limiting one’s conception of that discourse by separating it off from the 
other aspects of a person’s life. 
As the debate between Nielsen and Phillips concerns centrally the bear-
ing of the thought of Wittgenstein on philosophy of religion, it would be 
helpful to say something at this point about the word ›practice‹ and the 
philosophical weight that is placed on it in the present discussion. My 
presupposition – one that I draw from my reading of Wittgenstein – is 
that difference in philosophical aims can be parsed in terms of the notion 
of ›practice‹ or intentional activity coherent with a tradition. Intellectual 
traditions perpetuate expectations for what count as good reasons. Phi-
losophy may be thought of as an academic subject, but it is also a social 
activity. Among other activities, philosophers speculate and comment on, 
question and analyze arguments, ideas, experiences, and texts. As a social 
activity then – or better, a variety of social activities – philosophical prac-
tice is not any one tradition. Different conceptions of philosophy jostle 
alongside one another. In characterizing philosophical practices in this way, 
I draw on a passage in The Big Typescript, where Wittgenstein writes of 
meaning in terms of expectations. In the passage in question, Wittgenstein 
compares the phenomena of language use not so much to moves in games 
where one is active (acting according to a role) but to the expectations one 
has when participating in a collaborative endeavor.1 A realm of possible 
actions are conceivable to a participant; if one breaks those expectations, 
then it becomes clear that one either does not know how to play the game, 
is cheating, or is no longer playing the same game as the others. What I 
contend is that the disagreement between Nielsen and Phillips is like this; 
 1 L. Wittgenstein, The Big Typescript TS 213, ed. and trans. C.G. Luckhardt and 
M.A.E. Aue (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2005). See especially § 76 »Expectation: the 
Expression of Expectation. Articulate and Inarticulate Expectation«.
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they have different conceptions of, and therefore different expectations for, 
philosophy.
Phillips is perhaps the key philosopher Nielsen associates with Wittgen-
steinian fideism. It has not always been this way. As Béla Szabados observes 
in his opening essay for the joint volume by Nielsen and Phillips, Witt-
gensteinian Fideism? (2005), while Phillips goes unmentioned in Nielsen’s 
original essay, Nielsen later came to see Phillips as a classic example of a 
Wittgensteinian fideist.2 Yet Nielsen is ultimately ambivalent about the im-
portance of whether any actual philosopher holds the views he associates 
with Wittgensteinian fideism; for Nielsen, this view is itself a powerful pos-
sible problem for his secular ideal of human flourishing. Orthodox theo-
logical critics of Wittgensteinian philosophy of religion have also found 
traction in the ascription of fideism. For example, traditional Christian 
philosophers and theologians have typically sought realist interpretations 
of doctrinal statements and faith commitments and thus have been wary 
of the tendencies of Wittgensteinian philosophers who downplay meta-
physically rich renderings of those statements and commitments and focus 
instead on the practical manifestation, rather than the propositional con-
tent, of religious belief.3 For better or worse, the loose collection of ideas 
known as Wittgensteinian fideism has dominated much of the thinking 
about Wittgenstein and the philosophy of religion for the last forty years. 
It is ironic then that central to the dispute between Nielsen and Phillips 
is the fact that they have neither agreed on the criteria of Wittgensteinian 
fideism, nor have they agreed on the very connotations of ›fideism‹ itself; 
however, the publication of their joint volume Wittgensteinian Fideism? pro-
vides an accounting of their respective places in this dispute. It is a virtue of 
the book that it brings to the surface the problematic nature of the idea of 
Wittgensteinian fideism. Nielsen considers ›fideism‹ to be a neutral critical 
term of classification,4 while Phillips considers it to be a term of abuse,5 
a dynamic registered elsewhere in the history of disputes over the mean-
ing of ›fideism‹. Disagreement of this sort over the connotations of ›fide-
ism‹ is nothing new. From the origins of the term in nineteenth century 
French Catholic and Protestant theological discourses, to its place within 
 2 See B. Szabados, »Introduction: Wittgensteinian Fideism 1967–1989. An Appre-
ciation«, in K. Nielsen and D.Z. Phillips, Wittgensteinian Fideism? (London: SCM Press, 
2005), 4. See also Nielsen’s original 1967 essay »Wittgensteinian Fideism«, reprinted in 
ibid. 21–38.
 3 Similar theological concerns are present in Klaus von Stosch’s critique of Phillips, 
and specifically the »danger of relativism« in his contribution to the present volume 
(see p ……).
 4 See Nielsen, »Wittgensteinian Fideism Revisited«, in ibid. 97f.
 5 See Phillips, »Wittgenstein and Religion: Some Fashionable Criticisms«, in ibid. 
41f.
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contemporary academic discourse, ›fideism‹ has been taken by some to be 
a neutral term of classification and by others to be a pejorative, a brand to 
be avoided, condemned or defended against. While a few philosophers and 
theologians have used the term to describe their own thought, most have 
used the term to label the thought of another.6 For the purposes of this 
essay, I do not suppose Wittgensteinian fideism to refer to a single position 
in philosophy of religion; Nielsen and Phillips use the expression for pur-
poses related to their distinctive philosophical projects. As a brief survey of 
the history of their dispute shows, their lack of agreement over its criteria 
reflects the disparate ends of their respective conceptions of philosophy. 
For Nielsen, Wittgensteinian fideism is a philosophical stance that uses 
certain themes in Wittgenstein’s thought to defend religious beliefs from 
various kinds of criticism, whether the criticism comes from evidentialist 
epistemology, verificationist theories of meaning, or critical theories of 
religion, be they Marxist, Freudian or social-scientific. Nielsen does not 
explicitly define ›fideism‹; instead, he alludes to a certain irrationalism or 
absurdity in Wittgensteinian philosophy of religion that he seeks to iden-
tify so as to undermine its appeal, whatever that may be. Nielsen believes 
that the potential for fideism is present in Wittgenstein’s thought as well as 
in the thought of various philosophers working under his influence. As we 
will see, Nielsen is primarily concerned with challenging a possible philo-
sophical viewpoint, less so the specific views of a particular philosopher. 
What are these tendencies towards fideism in Wittgenstein’s philosophy? 
The central tendency is the rejection of an ›Archimedean‹ – or universal 
– point of view for assessing the meaningfulness of religious language or 
justification of religious belief; this rejection of an Archimedean point of 
view leads to the localization of justification and intelligibility to language-
games and forms of life. According to Nielsen, when these tendencies are 
exploited for the purpose of protecting religious beliefs, Wittgensteinian 
fideism is produced. The original eight theses that make up Wittgenstein-
ian fideism for Nielsen in the 1967 article are as follows:
1.The forms of language are the forms of life.
2.What is given are the forms of life.
 6 I explore some of the history of this dynamic in »The Traditions of Fideism«, 
Religious Studies 44 (2008) 1, 1–22. Because of this diverse history of usage, I argue that 
scholarly use of the term should also scrupulously acknowledge the tradition of use 
that informs the scholar’s own use of the term. It is interesting to observe that John 
Bishop describes his own view as a version of fideism in his recent book Believing by 
Faith: An Essay in the Epistemology and Ethics of Religious Belief (New York: Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 2007).
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3. Ordinary language is all right as it is.
4. A philosopher’s task is not to evaluate or criticise language or the forms of life, but 
to describe them where necessary and to the extent necessary to break philosophical 
perplexity concerning their operation.
5. The different modes of discourse which are distinctive forms of life all have a logic 
of their own.
6. Forms of life taken as a whole are not amenable to criticism; each mode of discourse 
is in order as it is, for each has its own criteria and each sets its own norms of 
intelligibility, reality and rationality.
7. These general, dispute-engendering concepts, i.e. intelligibility, reality, and rationality 
are systematically ambiguous; their exact meaning can only be determined in the 
context of a determinate way of life.
8. There is no Archimedean point in terms of which a philosopher (or for that matter 
anyone else) can relevantly criticise whole modes of discourse or, what comes to the 
same thing, ways of life, for each mode of discourse has its own specific criteria of 
rationality/irrationality, intelligibility/unintelligibility, and reality/unreality.7
As one might notice, the lack of an Archimedean point of view is a recur-
rent theme in Nielsen’s early characterization of Wittgensteinian fideism. 
However, other themes also emerge. Key among them is the conception 
of religions as language-games or forms of life. For Nielsen, the absence 
of an Archimedean standpoint when it comes to identifying meaning or 
justification is a central aspect of Wittgensteinian philosophy. Attributions 
of linguistic meaning and the giving of reasons are each confined to the 
sphere of their intelligibility, a region circumscribed by the language-game 
or form of life.
For the joint volume with Phillips, Nielsen returned to these ideas in 
»Wittgensteinian Fideism Revisited«. In response to Phillips’ criticism,8 
Nielsen includes textual citations in framing the theses that express Wit-
tgensteinian fideism. The five new theses Nielsen lists are:
1. »Within a language-game there is justification and lack of justification, evidence 
and proof, mistaken and groundless opinion [and the same obtains for forms of life or 
for what Peter Winch calls modes of social life], but one cannot properly apply these 
terms to the language-game [or form of life or mode of social life] itself.« (Norman 
Malcolm)
 7 Nielsen, »Wittgensteinian Fideism«, 22.
 8 See »Wittgenstein and Religion: Some Fashionable Criticisms«, Phillips’ preface 
to Belief, Change and Forms of Life (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1986), 
reprinted in Wittgensteinian Fideism?, 39–52.
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2. »Our religions, for example, Judaism, Christianity, Islam, Buddhism, Hinduism, are 
either themselves forms of life or (as Phillips sometimes prefers to say) in forms of life, 
each with their own distinctive clusters of language-games and practices. But how 
the language-games […] are taken depends on their connections with other things 
[…]. This larger context of human life, in which we see how a language-game is taken, 
Wittgenstein calls a form of life.« (D.Z. Phillips).
3. »Beliefs, utterances, conceptions, concepts ›are only intelligible in the context of 
ways of living or modes of social life as such‹ – that is in the contexts of forms of life 
or of being in forms of life.« (Peter Winch)
4. »Science is one such mode, morality another and religion still another or they are 
each distinctive clusters of practices in a form of life. [See notes 2 and 3.] ›Each has 
criteria of intelligibility peculiar to itself […] within science or religion actions can 
be logical or illogical‹, rational or irrational, reasonable or unreasonable, justified or 
unjustified, worthy of acceptance or not worthy of acceptance. ›But we cannot sensibly 
say that either the practice of science itself or that of religion is either illogical or 
logical; both are non-logical.‹« (Peter Winch)
5. »Because of the above (1–4), it makes no sense, Wittgenstein has it, to try to justify 
modes of social life or forms of life or distinctive clusters of practices, for example, 
science or religion, as such […]. There is neither a showing nor establishing that 
religious beliefs must be taken to be true nor that they must be taken to be false. 
Neither is there, on the one hand, a showing or establishing that they must be, or even 
are, worthy of belief nor that, on the other hand, they are to be set aside, if we are to be 
non-evasive, as not being worthy of belief. Justification cannot, given what justification 
is, have such a reach, such a purchase.«9
The textual support in the more recent list lends greater interpretive cred-
ibility to Nielsen’s idea of Wittgensteinian fideism. Without specific refer-
ences to the views of particular thinkers, it is hard to disagree with Niels-
en’s critics who maintain that Wittgensteinian fideism is a pejorative and 
thus unacademic term of abuse. Yet Nielsen remains ambivalent about the 
philosophical propriety of referring to the views of actual philosophers.10 
 9 Nielsen, »Wittgensteinian Fideism Revisited«, 100–101. The Norman Malcolm 
text in question is Thought and Knowledge (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1977), 
the D.Z. Phillips text is Belief, Change and Forms of Life, and the Peter Winch text is The 
Idea of a Social Science (London: Routledge, 1995).
 10 Nielsen writes: »I have come to see, or at least to think I see, that it is a mistake 
to go around asking who are the Wittgensteinian fideists. What is crucial to give, as I 
hope I have just done, a clear characterization of Wittgensteinian Fideism and show 
that it yields some plausible grounds for being called Wittgensteinian even if no Witt-
gensteinian on record ever held exactly that position, took exactly that stance […]. What 
matters is the position itself and its claims and implications. What matters is whether 
(on some reasonable reading) it is recognizably Wittgensteinian and whether it has 
force and is not an arbitrary view.« (See Nielsen’s essay »On the Obstacles of the Will«, 
in Wittgensteinian Fideism?, 322).
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He is concerned with Wittgensteinian fideism insofar as it is a possible 
threat to secularism.
It seems to me that Nielsen’s critique over the decades comes down to 
just three central ideas that he holds to constitute Wittgensteinian fideism 
when applied to the understanding of religions: (1) justification is internal 
to a language-game or form of life, (2) the meaning of terms is intelligible 
only within the language-games or forms of life out of which the terms 
come, and (3) it does not make sense to question the justification or the 
intelligibility of language in general; both of these concepts only properly 
apply within language-games and forms of life. Absent from the 2005 ac-
count is reference to the loss of an Archimedean point of view. In the 
original 1967 paper, Nielsen placed considerable emphasis on the idea that 
for Wittgensteinians there was no Archimedean point from which justifi-
cation or intelligibility could be universally assessed. At times, Nielsen has 
even written as if the rejection of such a »view from nowhere« (to borrow 
Thomas Nagel’s phrase) were itself enough to establish Wittgensteinian 
fideism; however, what I think he means is that this tendency is palpable in 
Wittgenstein’s writings and through his influence in philosophy. Interest-
ingly, Nielsen holds that one need not be religious to be a Wittgensteinian 
fideist; he takes the view to encapsulate a philosopher’s stance towards the 
issue of the localization of intelligibility and justification of religious belief 
and not essentially a religious philosopher’s appropriation of Wittgenstein 
to stave off secular critique.
These early remarks on the absence of an Archimedean standpoint reso-
nate with Nielsen’s more recent remarks on Wittgensteinian fideism, and 
this suggests to me that they are what he takes to be central in the older 
characterization as well. Indeed, in his final contribution to the joint volume 
with Phillips, Nielsen characterizes the hypothetical Wittgensteinian fideist 
view thus: »There are no context-independent and form-of-life indepen-
dent practice-transcendent criteria of rationality by which our modes of 
social life can be assessed or criticized for they supply our very standards of 
assessment or criticism and criteria of intelligibility.«11 The rejection of the 
Archimedean standpoint in philosophy is one of those philosophical prin-
ciples Nielsen sees in Wittgenstein’s thought that allows for the possibility 
of fideism. I interpret the central thesis of Nielsen’s conception of Wit-
tgensteinian fideism to be the rejection of the public contestability of the 
reasonableness of religious belief. An Archimedean criterion of justifica-
tion or meaningfulness would secure an objective means of public contest-
ability, but Nielsen would welcome an intersubjective, fallibilist conception 
of public contestability in its place. Nielsen’s problem with Wittgenstein-
ian philosophy of religion is that he understands it to foreclose on both 
 11 Ibid. 321.
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notions of public contestability; in rejecting an Archimedean measure for 
intelligibility and justification, he takes Wittgensteinian philosophy of reli-
gion to reject the possibility of any objective or intersubjective measure.
Nielsen’s critique of Wittgensteinian fideism may perhaps be better un-
derstood against the background of other developments in his philosophi-
cal work. In such work, he develops his fallibilist, intersubjective concep-
tion of public contestability. Nielsen’s 1998 essay »On Being a Secularist All 
the Way Down«12 may be instructive for this purpose. In the essay, Nielsen 
subscribes to what he calls »social naturalism«: a view that »takes human 
beings to be irreducibly social beings and the human animal as being a self-
interpreting animal«.13 Nielsen’s view of human nature is such that human 
social life is partly constituted through the practice of numerous language-
games, no one of which – be it physics, anthropology or poetry – has a 
privileged grasp on truth. Nielsen thus eschews an Archimedean point of 
view, and yet he finds an intersubjective means of improving and expand-
ing one’s belief-system. His secular ideal of cooperative human flourish-
ing involves the pursuit of what he calls »wide reflective equilibrium« (an 
epistemic goal he borrows from John Rawls’ A Theory of Justice): the coher-
ence of our beliefs and practices both within a larger web of belief and 
practice and in relation to theories of human nature, society and psychol-
ogy (to name a few). For Nielsen, wide reflective equilibrium is the aim 
of education and, one might say, philosophical activity. Nielsen’s secularist 
ideal is also centrally fallibilist: »We can, however, never reasonably expect 
firm closure; we will at best get something that for a time obtains, knowing 
full well that this will always be only for a time […]. The reflective equilib-
rium will, sooner or later, be upset and another will need to be forged.«14 
In the essay, Nielsen holds religions to be problematic because they shun 
fallibilism in favor of an epistemic goal of certainty. Wittgensteinian fide-
ism is problematic for Nielsen because it characterizes religions in such 
a way that they are enclosed within language-games or forms of life; it 
excludes religions from the public conversation over the viability of be-
liefs and practices Nielsen takes to be critical for our collective flourishing. 
Wittgensteinian fideism thus protects religious beliefs and practices from 
public contestability.
Nielsen draws on the fallibilism of Peirce in forming his secular ideal of 
human flourishing. While ultimately, Nielsen agrees with W.K. Clifford’s 
evidentialist measure for belief, »[i]t is wrong always, everywhere, and for 
 12 Nielsen, »On Being a Secularist All the Way Down«, in Idem, Naturalism and 
Religion (Amherst, N.Y.: Prometheus Books, 2001), 56–76.
 13 Ibid. 57.
 14 Ibid. 69.
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every one, to believe anything upon insufficient evidence«,15 Nielsen’s evi-
dentialism is tempered by his pragmatism. Nielsen seems to agree with the 
intellectual imperative Clifford formulates but sees pragmatist fallibilism as 
a good means to the evidentialist end. Nielsen recognizes that proportion-
ing one’s beliefs to the evidence is a matter of achieving coherence in one’s 
worldview (i.e., one’s patterned set of beliefs and practices) and achiev-
ing coherence between that worldview and current scientific theories. It 
may not be obvious that a belief or a practice is incoherent with one’s 
worldview. In an essay, »Wittgenstein and Wittgensteinians on Religion«, 
originally written for his Naturalism and Religion but included in the joint 
volume, Nielsen writes:
There are many situations, perhaps most situations, in which we have no need ›at all‹ to 
explain a practice. The practice seems to us – and sometimes rightly so – unproblematic. 
But then, as C.S. Peirce and John Dewey stressed, circumstances might arise in which 
we need, or at least want, an explanation for one or another specific pragmatic purpose 
– political, moral, sociological, or some combination of them – or perhaps because the 
practice does not seem for some reasonably specific reasons to be working so well and 
indeed might not be working well.16
It is when the irritation of doubt occurs that it becomes necessary to 
»fix« one’s beliefs.17 A matter that is implicit in the epistemic goal of wide 
reflective equilibrium is that there is no view from nowhere by means of 
which one may measure the justification of one’s set of beliefs and practices. 
But Nielsen favors pragmatist fallibilism to what he understands to be the 
metaphysical and epistemological quietism of Wittgenstein and Wittgen-
steinian philosophers. Later in the same essay, Nielsen writes: »There is no 
Archimedean point, independent of all practices, from which to criticize any of 
them. But from this – to make a good Peircean point – it does not follow 
that any practice is immune from or beyond criticism.«18 These remarks 
seem to suggest that Nielsen’s considered view is that it is not so much the 
rejection of an Archimedean sense of justification and intelligibility that 
leads to Wittgensteinian fideism as the quietism that follows on localizing 
justification and intelligibility to language-games and forms of life.
The rejection of an Archimedean sense of justification or intelligibility 
in favor of metaphysical quietism can be perhaps fairly ascribed to Nor-
 15 W.K. Clifford, »The Ethics of Belief«, reprinted in The Ethics of Belief and Other 
Essays (Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 1999), 77.
 16 Nielsen, »Wittgenstein and Wittgensteinians on Religion«, in Wittgensteinian Fi-
deism?, 252.
 17 See C.S. Peirce, »The Fixation of Belief«, Popular Science Monthly 12 (November 
1877), 1–15.
 18 Nielsen, »Wittgenstein and Wittgensteinians on Religion«, 275.
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man Malcolm and Peter Winch.19 According to P.F. Bloemendaal, Malcolm 
makes two critical moves in the early essay »Anselm’s Ontological Argu-
ments« (1960), that would prove influential in early Wittgensteinian phi-
losophy of religion. First of all, Malcolm directs special attention to the use 
of ›religious language‹. Second, in perhaps his most influential move, Mal-
colm treats religions as language-games. Bloemendaal also observes about 
Winch, »it is difficult to avoid the impression that The Idea of a Social Science 
presents social practices, traditions and institutions as more or less isolated 
and self-contained, each going its own, fairly autonomous, way – a neces-
sary ingredient, one might say, for a fideist philosophy«.20 
However, it remains to be seen just how well this criticism would tell 
against Phillips. Admittedly, the tone of Phillips’ writing is such that it 
emphasizes genre differences between religion, philosophy, and science.21 
Philosophical sympathy between Phillips and Winch is obvious in Phillips’ 
early essay »Philosophy, Theology and the Reality of God« (1963).22 Phil-
lips writes: »Theology cannot impose criteria of meaningfulness on reli-
gion from without. Neither can philosophy […]. The role of philosophy in 
this context is not to justify, but to understand.«23 As an interpretive mat-
ter, it is an open question whether Phillips rejects an Archimedean point 
of view. Phillips, instead, can be something of a provocateur in his writ-
ings. He seeks to upend conventional ways of thinking about philosophical 
problems or clichéd aspects of religious or ethical life and wishes to insti-
gate critical thought on concepts such as meaningfulness or justification 
by confronting the interlocutor or reader with the sense that philosophical 
and religious practice are not as closely connected as some philosophers of 
religion have argued. For example, in The Concept of Prayer (1965), Phillips 
is at pains to show the distance between language used in the practices of 
prayer or liturgy on the one hand and language used in disputations of 
epistemology or metaphysics on the other.
There are subtleties to Phillips’ views that are not registered in Nielsen’s 
critique. For example, Nielsen makes a much bigger affair of both the 
notions of ›language-games‹ and ›forms of life‹ in his critique of Phillips 
 19 See N. Malcolm, »Anselm’s Ontological Arguments«, Philosophical Review 69/1 
(1960), 41–62, and P. Winch, The Idea of a Social Science.
 20 See P.F. Bloemendaal, Grammars of Faith: A Critical Evaluation of D.Z. Phillips’s 
Philosophy of Religion (Leuven: Peeters, 2006), 115–118.
 21 Note, however, that this appreciation for genre difference is something that Niels-
en, too, recognizes.
 22 Reprinted in Phillips, Wittgenstein and Religion (London: St. Martin’s Press, 1993), 
1–9.
 23 Ibid. 5.
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than Phillips himself makes of these notions in his own writings.24 About 
this dynamic, Phillips wearily observes: »The most unfortunate aspect of 
discussions surrounding Wittgensteinian Fideism was that they diverted at-
tention from much deeper philosophical issues.«25 Indeed, I take this to be 
an important motivation to a more contemplative appraisal of this dispute, 
so as to disrupt uncharitable, and therefore superficial, depictions of the 
views of the interlocutors.
Phillips’ views have gone through notable development over the decades. 
While Phillips’ early philosophy of religion did emphasize the concepts 
of language-games and forms of life, Phillips’ views on Wittgenstein have 
evolved over time. Consider the following remark from his (relatively ear-
ly) 1971 essay »Religious Beliefs and Language-Games«:
I write this paper as one who has talked of religious beliefs as distinctive language-
games, but also as one who has come to feel misgivings in some respects about doing 
so.
What do these misgivings amount to? Partly, at least, they amount to a feeling that 
if religious beliefs are isolated, self-sufficient language-games, it becomes difficult to 
explain why people should cherish religious beliefs in the way they do. On the view 
suggested, religious beliefs seem more like esoteric games, enjoyed by the initiates 
no doubt, but of little significance outside the internal formalities of their activities. 
Religious activities begin to look like hobbies; something with which men occupy 
themselves at week-ends. From other directions, the misgivings involve the suspicion 
that religious beliefs are being placed outside the reach of any possible criticism, and 
that the appeal of the internality of religious criteria of meaningfulness can act as a 
quasi-justification for what would otherwise be recognized as nonsense.26
Phillips recognizes that the way he characterizes religious belief in some 
early writings invites some of the concern and criticism others have of-
fered. While not repudiating his earlier work, he instead offers in the pas-
sage above a corrective to his earlier tone.
Phillips argues that isolationist conceptions of religious life make reli-
gions into esoteric practices that are practically cut off from the rest of a 
person’s life. Phillips likens such a characterization of religion to a hobby. 
By »hobby«, I take it that Phillips means an amusement or diversion. The 
 24 It should be noted also that purveyors and critics of Wittgensteinian philosophy 
of religion make too much of language-games and forms of life (at least insofar as they 
seek to interpret, rather than draw inspiration from, Wittgenstein’s philosophy. See P. 
Sherry, Religion, Truth, and Language-Games (New York: Barnes & Noble Books, 1977) 
and I.U. Dalferth, »Wittgenstein: The Theological Reception«, in Religion and Witt-
genstein’s Legacy, eds. Phillips and M. von der Ruhr (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005).
 25 Phillips, »Introduction«, in Wittgenstein and Religion, xii.
 26 Phillips, »Religious Beliefs and Language-Games«, in Philosophy of Religion, ed. B. 
Mitchell (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971), 121–142.
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major aim of Phillips’ philosophy is to show how religion is a far more 
complex phenomenon than many philosophers suppose it to be. Religion 
is a phenomenon that infuses a person’s life; it is something within which 
a person’s life may be immersed. Contrary to critics who suggest Phillips 
holds an isolationist view of religious life, Phillips maintains that his work, 
as exemplified in The Concept of Prayer, seeks to explore »the connections 
which do exist between prayer and the events of human life«.27 Phillips 
continues:
The fact of such connections is not contingently related to the meaning of prayer. How 
could God be thanked if there were nothing to thank God for? How could confessions 
be made to God if there were nothing to confess? How could petitions be made to God 
in the absence of purposes and desires? So far from denying the connections between 
prayer and these features of human life, I argued that if such connections are severed, 
the religious significance of ›prayer‹ becomes problematic.28
Although this may not be a vital concern for naturalist critics of religions 
such as Nielsen, it shows that Phillips appreciates that an isolationist con-
ception of religious life, especially when taken as part of a comprehensive 
theory of religion, is not quite right. This would seem to suggest that both 
Nielsen and Phillips agree (although for different reasons) that language-
games are not to be thought of as isolated from each other or from other 
areas of human emotional and intellectual life. An absurdity to the debate 
over Wittgensteinian fideism is that both principal disputants agree that the 
view under consideration – variously understood – is to be avoided. What 
is interesting in their disagreement is why they each reject the view they 
label ›Wittgensteinian fideism‹, for their reasons differ and point to their 
preferred conceptions of philosophy.
Since Phillips’ considered view is that language-games overlap and com-
bine within religious ways of life, it seems odd to saddle his later thought 
with the internalist, language-game conception of religion that is char-
acteristic of some early Wittgensteinian philosophy of religion and the 
ideas of Wittgensteinian fideism. Furthermore, in more recent writings, 
Phillips has continued to develop his Wittgenstein-inspired contemplative 
approach to the study of religions, but emphases have shifted in terms of 
what aspects of Wittgenstein’s thought are now taken as most helpful for 
philosophy of religion. Consider the following remark from Religion and 
the Hermeneutics of Contemplation (2001):
I want to demonstrate the need to go beyond the hermeneutics of recollection and 
the hermeneutics of suspicion to the hermeneutics of contemplation. The last is simply 
an application to religion of the more general contemplative character of philosophy 
itself. This philosophical contemplation waits on the role concepts play in human 
 27 Phillips, »Wittgenstein and Religion«, in Wittgensteinian Fideism?, 44f.
 28 Ibid. 45.
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life. In doing so, it faces head-on the fundamental conceptual issues separating the 
hermeneutics of ›recollection‹ and ›suspicion‹. Can religion be explained in non-
religious terms? Is religion a surface phenomenon which can be analyzed in terms 
more real and fundamental than its own? Does religion have anything to say which is 
irreducibly religious?29 
Phillips here characterizes the dominant theoretical approaches to the 
study of religions under the rubrics of the hermeneutics of suspicion and 
the hermeneutics of recollection. The former class includes various criti-
cal theories of religion that explain the phenomena of religion through 
appeal to natural phenomena (e.g. Feuerbach’s criticism of religion as the 
fear of death, Marx’s analysis of religion as the product of class struggle, 
and Freud’s criticism of religion as an alternate expression of desire for 
a providential father). The latter class includes various approaches seek-
ing to reveal the underlying truth behind religious phenomena. Phillips 
understands the hermeneutics of recollection to include movements such 
as Reformed Epistemology (e.g. Plantinga), refurbished natural theology 
(e.g. Swinburne), and continental hermeneutics (e.g. Ricœur), which each 
seek to bring readers to a »second naiveté«30 regarding the truth-claims of 
religions. 
Phillips wants to locate his approach in a third category, the hermeneutics 
of contemplation. He seeks neither to prove the truth of a religion, nor ex-
plain its illusory quality; instead, he takes the proper project of the philoso-
pher to be to clarify the ›grammar‹ of religious expressions and practices. 
But this should not be interpreted as a return to a language-game concep-
tion of religion (i.e., to a rigid identification of religions as language-games 
or forms of life). One wonders if clarification of the conditions of the pos-
sibility of religious discourses may involve a wide variety of interpretive 
practices (historical, sociological, aesthetic) working in concert to present 
the philosopher with a rich portrait of those religious discourses.
 29 Phillips, Religion and the Hermeneutics of Contemplation (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2001), 4–5.
 30 I borrow this expression from Paul Ricœur to refer to religious belief that comes 
after criticism. For Ricœur, the hermeneutical process aides in this reorientation to-
wards religious symbols. Ricœur writes in The Symbolism of Evil: »Does that mean that 
we could go back to a primitive naiveté? Not at all. In every way, something has been 
lost, irremediably lost: immediacy of belief. But if we can no longer live the great sym-
bolisms of the sacred in accordance with the original belief in them, we can, we mod-
ern men, aim at a second naiveté in and through criticism. In short, it is by interpreting 
that we can hear again. Thus it is in hermeneutics that the symbol’s gift of meaning 
and the endeavor to understand by deciphering are knotted together.« (P. Ricœur, The 
Symbolism of Evil, trans. E. Buchanan (New York: Beacon Press, 1967), 351.
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Phillips notes that this approach may appear to some to be apologetics 
in disguise, a veiled version of the hermeneutics of recollection.31 After all, 
does not this approach leave everything as it is? Does not this preclude 
criticism as Nielsen would argue? Phillips writes:
Philosophical contemplation rescues atheism, as much as belief, from distortions of 
itself. We still need not deny that there are unbelievers who see no sense in religion, 
and religious believers who see no sense in atheism. An appreciation of the virtues of 
philosophical contemplation would lead to a different attitude towards such blindness. 
Just as there is a difference between saying, ›I do not appreciate chamber music‹, 
and saying, ›There is nothing in chamber music to appreciate‹, so there would be a 
difference between someone’s saying that they cannot see any sense in either religion 
or atheism, and the claim that there is no sense in either to be appreciated.32
As Phillips observes in Philosophy’s Cool Place (1999), contemplative phi-
losophy recognizes both the ideas that »(a) Philosophy is an attempt to give 
an account of Reality«, and »(b) If one provides any measure of ›the real‹, 
one can always, in turn, pose a question about the reality of the measure. 
No measure offered can avoid this difficulty«.33 Yet contemplative philoso-
phy does not generalize from these two observations; it does not carry on 
into skepticism, nihilism, or, dare one say it, fideism. It stops short of these 
generalizations. Contemplative philosophy’s task is dialectical; it inquires 
into accounts of reality.
What Phillips is after, as a conception of philosophy of religion, is a man-
ner of understanding that appreciates aesthetically, psychologically, imagi-
natively (i.e., deeply and thoroughly) the many dimensions of religious 
life, as well as atheism, on their own terms. One may well subsequently 
judge religious or secular ways of living to be unappealing, or quite attrac-
tive, but what one judges after contemplation is grasped with intellectual 
charity or empathy. If a critic, such as Nielsen, is not satisfied with Phillips’ 
contemplative philosophical practice, it is because Phillips conceives of dif-
ferent ends for philosophical inquiry than would be found with Nielsen’s 
evidentialist, naturalist ideal of human flourishing. For Nielsen, the aim 
of philosophy is to answer the intellectual imperative to achieve as much 
coherence in one’s belief system as one’s historical circumstances allow, in 
the effort to promote the cooperative venture of human social life. Phi-
losophy of religion that does not aid and may indeed preclude dialogue 
and cooperation would seem then to run counter to the spirit of Nielsen’s 
 31 Indeed, this is precisely what Nielsen as well as Wayne Proudfoot contend. It is 
ironic that a viewpoint might be described as apologetic insofar as it is fideistic. In 
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Catholic and Protestant theologians 
criticized as fideistic religious viewpoints that eschewed or otherwise undermined 
natural theology, the traditional means for apologetics. 
 32 Ibid. 5–6.
 33 Phillips, Philosophy’s Cool Place (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999).
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philosophy. For Phillips, philosophy, and thus philosophy of religion, is also 
a response to an intellectual imperative; in this case, it is the imperative to 
understand a mode of philosophical or religious discourse as clearly and 
dispassionately as one is able.
Both Nielsen and Phillips conceive of philosophy in terms of what its 
proper ends should be, in terms of response to intellectual duties. While 
Nielsen’s model of philosophy draws inspiration from the more empirical 
variants of American pragmatism, Phillips’ view of the ends of philosophy 
are drawn from Wittgenstein’s overarching desire to search out clarity for 
its own sake. For some in philosophy, it seems implausible that a search-
ing clarity, or perspicuity, might be a legitimate goal in itself for philoso-
phy. For many more practically-minded philosophers, the clarity that is 
the result of philosophical analysis is pursued for what it may enable one 
to do (say, build a theory about the subject matter in question); however, 
Wittgensteinian philosophers have been drawn – especially recently – to 
view the clearing away of confusions or equivocations as a proper end to 
philosophy. 
There is some debate over whether these ethical, therapeutic or con-
templative readings of Wittgenstein’s import for philosophy amount to the 
same thing. Stephen Mulhall and Phillips disagree over the value of Stanley 
Cavell’s and James Conant’s work on the putatively therapeutic dimensions 
of Wittgensteinian philosophy.34 Mulhall counsels greater consonance be-
tween the contemplative and therapeutic readings of Wittgenstein, while 
Phillips demurs.35 Does searching for perspicuity transform not just the 
philosopher’s awareness of the object of study, but also the philosopher 
her- or himself. While ethical-therapeutic readings of Wittgenstein would 
emphasize the effects of working through a text such as, say, the Tractatus 
Logico-Philosophicus or Philosophical Investigations on the reader, Phillips’ con-
templative philosophy demarcates the personal from the philosophical.36 In 
this sense, Phillips’ contemplative philosophy remains more rational phi-
losophy than spiritual contemplation. The personal gain that may come 
from contemplative philosophy, no matter how admirable, is not for Phil-
lips philosophy.
The problems that Nielsen and other critics find in what they call Wit-
tgensteinian fideism stem essentially from the idea of religions being iso-
 34 See S. Mulhall, »Wittgenstein’s Temple: Three Styles of Philosophical Architec-
ture«, and Phillips, »Locating Philosophy’s Cool Place – A Reply to Stephen Mulhall«, 
in D.Z. Phillips’ Contemplative Philosophy of Religion, ed. A.F. Sanders (Aldershot: Ash-
gate, 2007), 13–28, 29–54.
 35 See Patrick Horn’s contribution to the present volume for more on this topic.
 36 This latter demarcation is yet another area of disagreement between Mulhall 
and Phillips. See Mulhall, »Avoiding Nonsense, Keeping Cool: Nielsen, Phillips and 
Philosophy in the First Person«, in Wittgensteinian Fideism?
Thomas D. Carroll16
lated language-games or forms of life. For Phillips, however, the problem 
with Wittgensteinian fideism, aside from the pejorative connotations of 
the label, is that what Wittgensteinian fideism suggests about religion is 
a distortion of what Phillips understands religious life to encompass. The 
compartmentalization of religious belief robs religious practice of its deep 
connections with a person’s life (with a person’s moral life, for example). 
Phillips wants to rescue religions not from critique but rather from distor-
tion, a distortion that both practitioners and outsiders may well be prone 
towards making. Here is where I see in Phillips’ later thought a particular 
affinity with Wittgenstein. For Wittgenstein too, a searching clarity, or per-
spicuity [die Durchsichtigkeit], may be thought of as a proper end for philo-
sophical practice. Indeed, the ideal of perspicuity as the end of philosophy 
runs through Wittgenstein’s corpus, from his earliest writings to his last. 
Wittgenstein’s model of philosophical practice deters the philosopher from 
temptations towards equivocation.
From Wittgenstein’s writings, it is easy to see that he considered his pur-
suit of perspicuity to be very demanding. Consider the following from 
1931: »I believe that what is essential is for the activity of clarification to 
be carried out with COURAGE; without this it becomes a mere clever 
game«.37 The fact that Wittgenstein occasionally referred to it with moral 
imagery suggests he saw the pursuit of a searching clarity to be difficult, 
perhaps something that goes against aspects of our human condition. Con-
templation is thus a practice to be cultivated. It is because of our tendencies 
to see similarities where they may not be and to equivocate where it is 
unjustified that good habits of contemplation are needed. Although con-
templative analyses of philosophical disputes may not resolve them, these 
analyses provide accounts of where the disagreement lies. This is especially 
important when the debate in question is not over the relative merits of a 
proposition (the mere description of which may be uncontroversial), but 
instead concerns itself with questions of hermeneutical charity, obstinance 
and the intellectual duties of a philosophical vocation.
 37 L. Wittgenstein, Culture and Value, Revised Edition, ed. G.H. von Wright 
(Malden, MA: Blackwell, 1998), 16e.
